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Abstract—We use a general hill-climbing attack algorithm
based on Bayesian adaption to test the vulnerability of an
Eigenface-based approach for face recognition against indirect
attacks. The attacking technique uses the scores provided by
the matcher to adapt a global distribution, computed from a
development set of users, to the local specificities of the client
being attacked. The proposed attack is evaluated on an Eigenface-
based verification system using the XM2VTS database. The
results show a very high efficiency of the hill-climbing algorithm,
which successfully bypassed the system for over 85% of the
attacked accounts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric security systems present several advantages over
traditional security approaches [1] and consequently they are
currently being introduced in many applications, including:
access control, sensitive data protection, and on-line tracking
systems. However, in spite of these advantages they can be
exposed to external attacks which can decrease their level of
security. Thus, it is of utmost importance to analyze the vulner-
abilities of biometric systems, in order to find their limitations
and to develop useful countermeasures for foreseeable attacks.
There are some previous works that study the robustness
of biometric systems against attacks carried out against the
input of the matching module. In [2] a model-based attack
which is capable of reconstructing the user’s face images from
the matching scores is presented. The method has the strong
constraint of needing a large number of real face images to
initialize the algorithm.
Most of the existing works studying the vulnerabilities of
biometric systems to attacks against the inner modules of the
system, apart from [2], use some type of variant of the hill-
climbing algorithm presented in [3]. Some examples include
an attack to a face-based system in [4], and to a standard and a
Match-on-Card minutiae-based fingerprint verification systems
in [5] and [6] respectively. These attacks take advantage of the
score given by the matcher to iteratively change a synthetically
created template until the similarity score exceeds a fixed
decision threshold and thereby gain access to the system.
Most of these hill-climbing approaches are all highly depen-
dent on the technology used, only being usable for very spe-
cific type of matchers. However, in [7] a general hill-climbing
algorithm based on Bayesian adaptation was presented and
tested using a signature verification system.
In the present contribution this general attack is success-
fully applied to an automatic face recognition system based
on eigenfaces thus proving its biometric independency and
its ability of adapt to different matchers which use fixed
length feature vectors. The experiments are conducted on the
XM2VTS database [8], from which it is shown that the attack
is able to bypass over 85% of the accounts attacked for the
best configuration of the algorithm found. Furthermore, the
hill-climbing approach is shown to be faster than a brute-force
attack for all the operating points evaluated, as well as being
capable of reconstructing the user’s face image without using
any real face images to initialize the algorithm.
The paper is structured as follows. The hill-climbing attack
algorithm used in the experiments is outlined in Sect. II, while
the attacked system is presented in Sect. III. The database and
experimental protocol followed are described in Sect IV. The
results are detailed in Sect. V and conclusions are finally drawn
in Sect. VI.
II. BAYESIAN HILL-CLIMBING ATTACK ALGORITHM
The term hill-climbing designates an attack in which the
similarity score given by the matcher is used to iteratively
modify a synthetically generated template, or group of tem-
plates, until the verification threshold (δ) is reached.
In the present contribution we use the Bayesian approach
for hill-climbing presented in [7]. The core idea behind the
algorithm is to iteratively adapt a known global distribution
to the local specificities of the unknown user being attacked.
For this purpose, a pool of users is used to compute the
general statistical model G, which is sampled N times. Each
sampled point yi (i = 1 . . . N ) in the distribution is compared
with the client being attacked C, generating N similarity
scores si = J(C,yi). The M points which have generated
higher scores are then used to compute a local distribution
L, which is used to generate an adapted distribution A, that
trades off (according to a parameter α) the general knowledge
provided by G and the local information given by L. The
global distribution is then redefined as G = A, and the process
continues until the finishing criterion is met, i.e., one of the
scores s∗ = J(C,y∗) exceeds the similarity threshold, or the
maximum number of iterations is reached.
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Fig. 1. FAR and FRR curves for the Eigenface-based system.
III. FACE VERIFICATION SYSTEM ATTACKED
The described Bayesian hill-climbing algorithm is used to
attack an Eigenface-based face verification system [9]. This
technique uses Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to derive
a vector space which represents the face images in a lower
dimensional space, this technique was used to present initial
face verification results for the recent Face Recognition Grand
Challenge [10].
The evaluated system uses cropped face images of size
64 × 80 to train a PCA vector space where 80% of the
variance is retained. This leads to a system where the original
image space of 5120 dimensions is reduced to 91 dimen-
sions (or eigenvectors). Similarity scores are computed in
this PCA vector space using the standard correlation metric,
d(x,y) = 1 − [(x − µx) · (y − µy)]/σxσy, as it showed the
best performance out of the tested similarity measures.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL
The experiments are carried out on the XM2VTS face
database [8], comprising 295 users. The database was acquired
in four time-spaced capture sessions in which two different
face images of each client were taken under controlled condi-
tions (pose and illumination) to complete the total 295× 8 =
2, 360 samples of the database. Two evaluation protocols are
defined for this database, the Lausanne Protocol 1 and 2 (LP1
and LP2).
A. Performance Evaluation
The performance of the evaluated system is computed using
LP2. The LP2 is chosen as LP1 has a bias to learn the
environmental conditions because two independent capture
sessions are available whereas for LP2 only one session
is available. Also the evaluation data from LP2 is used to
compute G, rather than the development data, as there is almost
three times the number of impostors available (70 impostors
instead of 25); only impostors are used to calculate G as
explained in Sect. IV-B.
According to LP2, the database is divided into: i) a training
set comprising the samples of the two first sessions of 200
clients (used to compute both the PCA transformation matrix
and the enrollment templates), and ii) an evaluation set formed
by the fourth session images of the previous 200 users (used
to compute the genuine scores for the evaluation), and all
the 8 images of 70 different users with which the impostor
scores are calculated. As a result of using the same subjects for
PCA training and client enrollment, the system performance
is optimistically biased, and therefore harder to attack than
in a practical situation (in which the enrolled clients may
not have been used for PCA training). This means that the
results presented in this paper are a conservative estimate of
the attack’s success rate.
The final score given by the system is the average of the
p scores obtained after matching the input vector to the p
templates of the attacked client model C. In Fig. 1 we can
see the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection
Rate (FRR) curves of the Eigenface-based system using the
described protocol with p = 4 enrollment templates. The
system has an Equal Error Rate of 4.74%. The three operating
points where the hill-climbing algorithm is evaluated (corre-
sponding to FAR=0.1%, FAR=0.05%, and FAR=0.01%) are
also highlighted. These operating points correspond to a low,
medium, and high security application according to [11].
B. Experimental Protocol for the Attacks
In order to generate the user accounts to be attacked using
the hill-climbing algorithm, we used the train set defined by
LP2 (i.e., samples corresponding to the first 2 sessions of
200 users). The initial K-variate distribution G of the attack
algorithm, was estimated using the first session of all the
impostors of the test set (70 users) defined in LP2. This
way, there is no overlap between the attacked set of users
(200 accounts), and the subjects used to initialize the attack
algorithm, which could lead to biased results on the success
rate (SR) of the attack. The SR is defined as the number of
accounts broken Ab by the attack (i.e., accounts where the hill-
climbing scheme reaches the decision threshold δ), divided
by the total number of accounts attacked AT = 200. Thus,
SR = Ab/AT .
V. RESULTS
The goal of the experiments is to study the vulnerability of
automatic face recognition systems to hill-climbing attacks.
At the same time, we will test the viability of applying
the Bayesian-based hill-climbing attack algorithm to other
biometric traits (it was already successfully applied to attack
an on-line signature verification system in [7]).
In the first set of experiments, we study the effect of varying
the three parameters of the attack algorithm (N , M , and α)
on the success rate (SR) of the attack over the Eigenface-
based system working with the standard correlation metric.
The objective is to reach an optimal configuration where the
number of broken accounts is maximized, while minimizing
the average number of comparisons (ncomp) needed to reach
TABLE I
SUCCESS RATE (IN %) OF THE HILL-CLIMBING ATTACK FOR INCREASING
VALUES OF N (NUMBER OF SAMPLED POINTS) AND M (BEST RANKED
POINTS). THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF ITERATIONS ALLOWED IS GIVEN IN
BRACKETS. THE SUCCESS RATE (IN %) APPEARS IN PLAIN TEXT, WHILE
THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF ITERATIONS NEEDED TO BREAK AN ACCOUNT
APPEARS IN BOLD. THE BEST CONFIGURATION OF PARAMETERS N AND
M IS HIGHLIGHTED IN GREY.
N
10
(2500)
25
(1000)
50
(500)
100
(250)
200
(125)
3 84.55,162
86.0
4,413
86.0
4,669
86.0
5,226
86.0
6,296
5 81.55,796
86.0
4,275
86.0
4,512
86.0
5,022
86.0
5,988
M 10 85.54,534
86.0
4,540
86.0
5,019
86.0
5,941
25 86.05,213
86.0
5,379
86.0
6,256
50 86.06,455
86.0
6,934
100 86.08,954
the fixed threshold δ. As described in Sect. II, the above
mentioned parameters denote: N the number of points sampled
from the adapted distribution at a given iteration, M the
number of top ranked samples used at each iteration to adapt
the global distribution, and α is an adaptation coefficient
which varies from [0 . . . 1]. In the last experiment the attack
performance is computed for different operating points of the
system.
When presenting results the proposed hill-climbing algo-
rithm is compared to a brute-force attack. This provides an
overview of the system performance by presenting the number
of matches necessary to conduct a successful brute-force attack
at the operating point under consideration (nbf = 1/FAR).
However, it must be noted that the resource requirements of
the brute force attack are much greater because an efficient
brute-force attack requires a database of thousands of samples;
this is not the case for the hill climbing algorithm.
A. Analysis of sampled and retained points
For the initial evaluation of the algorithm, an operating point
of (FRR=50%, FAR=0.01%) was fixed. This FAR implies
that an eventual brute-force attack would be successful, on
average, after 10,000 comparisons. Given this threshold, the
algorithm was executed for different values of N and M
(fixing α = 0.5). Results are given in Table I. The maximum
number of iterations (nit) allowed for the algorithm appears
in brackets. This value changes according to N in order
to maintain constant the maximum number of comparisons
permitted (ncomp = N · nit). In plain text we show the
success rate of the attack (in % over the total 200 accounts
tested), while the average number of comparisons needed for
a successful attack is represented in bold.
An analysis of the average number of comparisons needed
to enter the system given in Table I shows that for N À M ,
the points selected to estimate the local distribution are too
specific and thus, the attack is slower, needing more compar-
Fig. 2. The four enrollment images (columns) constituting the model of
three of the unbroken accounts (rows).
isons to break the accounts with respect to the best trade-off
combination (N > M ). On the other hand, if N ' M , the
local distribution computed is too general, and again the attack
effectiveness in terms of the speed of the attack is reduced.
However, this effect cannot be observed in the success rate
of the attack, which is 86% for most of the configurations
evaluated (172 broken accounts out of a total of 200).
The 28 clients who remain robust to the attack are the same
in all cases. To search for an explanation, the 28 unbroken
client models (comprising the four images of the first two
database sessions) were matched to the other four images
of the user (those corresponding to sessions three and four).
None of the client models produced a score high enough to
enter the system, which means that these 28 clients would not
be suitable for face recognition under the considered system
working at the selected operation point. We can then conclude
that the attack successfully broke all the models that would
be used in a real application. In Fig. 2 the enrollment images
which form three of the resistant accounts are showed. In all
cases we can observe a great variance among the samples of a
given model (glasses/not glasses, different poses, and blurred
images).
B. Analysis of the adaptation coefficient
The best configuration of the parameters that can be ex-
tracted from Table I corresponds to [N = 25,M = 5]. For
this point, the number of accounts broken is maximized (86%),
and ncomp is minimized (4,275). This minimum represents less
than half of the expected number of matchings required for a
successful brute-force attack (nbf = 1/FAR= 10, 000).
For this configuration and for the same operating point
(FAR=0.01%), the effect of varying the adaptation coefficient
TABLE II
SUCCESS RATE (IN %) OF THE HILL-CLIMBING ATTACK FOR INCREASING VALUES OF α AND FOR [N,M ] = [25, 5]. THE SUCCESS RATE (IN %)
APPEARS IN PLAIN TEXT, WHILE THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF ITERATIONS NEEDED TO BREAK AN ACCOUNT APPEARS IN BOLD.
α 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
SR(%)
ncomp
0
25,000
84.5
6,468
86.0
5,121
86.0
4,617
86.0
4,381
86.0
4,273
86.0
4,380
81.0
4,990
71.5
7,901
51
10,404
20.0
14,154
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Fig. 3. Examples of the evolution of the score and the synthetic eigenfaces through the iterations of the attack for broken accounts. The dashed line represents
the objective threshold.
α on the performance of the attack is studied sweeping
its value from 0 (only the global distribution G is taken
into account), to 1 (only the local distribution L affects the
adaptation stage). The results are presented in Table II.
It can be observed that the maximum number of accounts
broken, and the minimum number of comparisons needed, is
reached for α = 0.5, which means that both the global and
local distributions should be given approximately the same
importance. As in the previous experiment, it can be noticed
that 14% percent of the accounts (the same 28 clients as in
the previous experiments) is never bypassed as a consequence
of the large user intra-variability.
C. Analysis of different operating points
Using the best configuration [N,M,α] = [25, 5, 0.5] the
algorithm was evaluated at two additional operating points
of the system (see Fig. 1). The two additional operating
points are: i) FAR=0.05%, FRR=30% and ii) FAR=0.1%,
FRR=25%, where a random brute-force attack would need on
average nbf = 2, 000 and nbf = 1, 000 matches respectively
before gaining access to the system. Results are given in
Table III.
Smaller values of the FAR rate imply a bigger value of the
threshold δ to be reached by the algorithm, which causes a rise
in the average number of iterations required for a successful
attack. In any case, the number of comparisons needed to break
the system by the hill-climbing algorithm is always lower than
that of a brute force attack, with the additional advantage that
only a few real face images are needed to initialize the hill-
climbing scheme.
In Figs. 3 and 4 two examples of broken and non-broken
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Fig. 4. Examples of the evolution of the score and the synthetic eigenfaces through the iterations of the attack for non-broken accounts. The dashed line
represents the objective threshold.
TABLE III
RESULTS OF THE ATTACK FOR DIFFERENT POINTS OF OPERATION AND
THE BEST CONFIGURATION FOUND OF THE ATTACKING ALGORITHM
(N = 25, M = 5, α = 0.5). THE SUCCESS RATE IS GIVEN IN PLAIN TEXT
(OVER A TOTAL OF 200 ACCOUNTS), AND ncomp IN BOLD. THE AVERAGE
NUMBER OF MATCHINGS NEEDED FOR A SUCCESSFUL BRUTE-FORCE
ATTACK (nbf ) IS ALSO GIVEN FOR REFERENCE.
Operating points (in %)
FAR=0.1 FAR=0.05 FAR=0.01
FRR=25 FRR=30 FRR=50
Success Rate (in %) 99.0 98.5 86.0
ncomp 840 1,068 4,492
nbf 1,000 2,000 10,000
accounts (corresponding to two of the users presented in
Fig. 2) are shown. For each of the examples, the evolution of
the score through the iterations of the algorithm is depicted,
together with six points (including the first and the last one)
of the iterative process (marked with letters A to F). The
dashed line represents the objective value to be reached (i.e.,
the threshold δ). The two upper faces correspond to one of the
original images of the attacked user and its representation in
the PCA space (where part of the information has been lost).
The sequence of the six faces below correspond to the feature
vectors that produced each of the six scores marked with A
to F, including the first one A which is produced by randomly
sampling the estimated general distribution G and the last one
F which is able to break the system.
In Figs. 3 and 4 we can observe that the hill-climbing
algorithm starts from a totally random face which is iteratively
modified to make it resemble as much as possible to the PCA
projection of the attacked users face (labeled as “Original-
PCA”). In both cases (broken and non-broken accounts) the
attack successfully finds a final image which is very similar
to the objective face, however, in the case of the accounts
resistant to the attack, the threshold is not reached as a
consequence of the large user intra-variability, which leads
to low scores even when compared with images of the same
client.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The robustness of a PCA-based face verification system
against a hill-climbing attack based on Bayesian adaptation
has been studied. Experimental results show that the system
is highly vulnerable to this type of attacking approach which
reached a success rate of over 85% in all the experiments
executed.
Although the hill-climbing algorithm used in the exper-
iments and a brute force attack are not fully comparable,
the performance of both approaches were confronted. The
results show that the hill-climbing attack is more efficient
under all tested conditions. In addition, it is worth noting that
the resources required by both approaches differ greatly. In
order to perform an efficient brute-force attack, the attacker
must have a database of more than a thousand real different
templates, while the hill-climbing approach just needs a small
set of samples to initialize the algorithm.
At the same time, it has been proven that the hill-climbing
algorithm algorithm can be successfully applied to different
biometric traits (in [7] it was tested with very good results
on an on-line signature verification system). Thus, this threat
should be taken into account when designing any biometric
security system working with fixed length feature vectors, and
the necessary countermeasures against the attack should be
introduced.
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